A Constitutional Post causing Constitutional Crises

In the pre-Bommai case era, when a national party won elections at the Centre, it consequently asked for the resignation of the state governments not aligned with its disposition. The Centre argued that the state governments had lost the mandate of the people. It was a classic case of a tussle between the the Federal and the Unitary structure of the government. Article 1 of the Indian Constitution says that - India i.e. Bharat is a union of states while the presence of a written constitution and the Seventh schedule cement the federal structure of our polity.
After the Bommai case, this dissolution of state assemblies on losing power in the Centre came to an end thus adding teeth to the federal provisions of our polity. It was naively assumed that this would end the Centre-State friction and foster harmony in their relation.
Sadly, this was not to be. The battleground had just changed its location. The governor, an appointee of the Centre and an integral part of the State Government sits at the junction where the twain doth meet. The governor wields immense power in their state which under certain circumstances dwarfs the tall stature of the elected representatives of the state - namely. the Assembly. There is no indirect election to the office of the Governor as is for the office of the President. This presents two facts :
The Governor is the only organ in the Indian Legislatures that derives its power from its appointing authority and not the people of India.
The Governor is the only organ in the Indian Legislatures who is not responsible to the people of India.
In the above context, the recent crises in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Uttrakhand, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and maybe Bihar too in the near future reveal that once we tune out the noise created by the various political parties and their various political calculations, the only issue remaining is the friction between the overlapping spheres of influence of the Governor and the Chief Minister.
Another common theme is the sword of Articles 356 and 365 dangling over the state legislature. The Bommai judgement in all its astuteness only gave the broad guidelines for the use of this sword and unintentionally sharpened it for more directed and noisier attacks. The emergence of regional parties and the hyper - regional parties have only added to this noise. Can India in this era of cooperative federalism afford to hold on to its colonial legacy of politically appointed executives?
The way forward is not so simple as it involves a restructuring of the Centre - State relations while the participants are unwilling to cede an inch but are desirous of gaining a mile. A few convention has emerged regarding the appointment of the Governor:
He must not be an active politician (there should be a cooldown period of 5 years to ensure this)
He must be an outsider to that state (this provision must be diluted to disallow only those candidates who have an interest in government contracts or have relatives in that state’s legislature)
The chief minister must be consulted for the appointment (there should be an appointment committee comprising of the PM, the Vice President, the concerned state’s CM and two senior most judges of the state's high court)
This collaborative appointment will do much to allay the fears of the states while giving adequate control to the Centre to ensure that the governance of the state is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.